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Introduction
Indo-Russian relations have overall 
remained smooth and continuous, though they 
have gone through distinct phases in their 
history and development.1 Interestingly, these 
phases relate to the national interests of these 
two countries as well as each of these phases 
has some linkages to the global environment. 
One can classify these phases as- 1947-1956, 
1956-1971, 1971-1985, 1985-1996 & 1996 
onwards. In each of these phases, Indo-Russian 
relations have grown or declined depending on 
the perceptions and experiences that both the 
countries have had mainly with the Western 
powers. The rough period in Russian-Indian 
relations post-1985 clearly arose from the felt 
need of both to connect more seriously with the 
West. However, overall the bilateral relationship 
has been characterised by a strong sense of 
commitment towards each other. Each of these 
phases has some distinct characteristics in terms 
of trade and political relations.
For instance, in phase 1956-1971 and 1971-
1985, trade between the two was state dominated 
but this ended after phase 1985-1996. During 
phase 1996 onwards, trade was dominated by 
military hardware and joint military production 
between the two sides. There is a fundamental 
baseline in the relation between these two 
countries that has built up over the years. 
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The Political Dimension –  
The Post Cold War Era
The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War brought about a 
fundamental transformation in the geopolitical 
map of the world.2 The most prominent among the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, Russia, in 
spite of inheriting the formidable military might 
of its predecessor, suddenly found itself reduced 
to the position of a second ranking regional 
power. Its predicament was further compounded 
by economic chaos and political uncertainty 
at the domestic level. It was clearly caught 
between a declining nostalgia for past relations 
with countries like India and growing proclivity 
towards cultivating relations with the West.3 As a 
result, the first couple of years of India’s relations 
with post-Soviet Russia were marked by a good 
deal of uncertainty, inconsistency and lack of 
clarity.
India did take early steps, though they did 
not yield any significant results. The two-track 
approach that India adopted was on the one 
hand aimed at resurrecting the vital elements of 
its economic and military relations with Russia 
and on the other searching out alternatives in 
the West, as the unipolar international order had 
emerged. 
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain 
Russian foreign policy objectives that the post-
Cold War relations between Russia and India 
were further strained by two events. The first 
of these destabilizing events centered around 
a contract dispute between the Russian space 
directorate “Glavkosmos” and the Government 
of India for the purchase of Cryogenic engines 
and the related technology. The contract, signed 
on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India’s 
desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen 
propulsion system of Russian Cryogenic engines 
in order to advance India’s Geo-synchronous 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) programme. 
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, 
the Cryogenic engine deal was legal under the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
on the grounds that the treaty did not block the 
support of “peaceful space ventures.” While the 
ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs 
and ICBMs was delayed by several years due to 
the cancellation of the original Cryogenic engine 
deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that 
the Yeltsin government had given in to Western 
pressure. The conclusion drawn in New Delhi 
was that Russia’s overriding need for American 
economic aid would make it susceptible to 
American pressure. In Indian eyes, Russia was 
therefore perceived as henceforth unreliable, 
and it had also lost its international stature. As 
Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under 
Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions 
between the two states also revealed tensions.
Relations between the two re-stabilized 
again after 1996 when both Russia and India 
realised that the West, especially the United States 
had not lived up to their expectations to deliver 
its promises to both these countries. The China 
threat factor also remained as a major impediment 
for India to look forward for a better relationship 
with Russia. On the other hand, Russia too gave 
up its initial hesitation and inconsistency in 
engaging India. This was possible as the Russian 
leadership itself felt that overtly banking on the 
western world was making it susceptible and 
creating major fissures within the Russian society. 
For the last eight decades it had been extremely 
anti-West and a sudden closeness with the West 
might bewilder the nation fully. So there was a 
need to accept more or less a balanced approach 
especially while initiating and even continuing 
relations with nations. 
With time, the contours of new Russian 
foreign policy have become clearer. It is now 
giving all the indications of its ability and 
intentions of redefining its foreign policy goals, 
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priorities and international role. With India, the 
objectives and character of its relations are being 
defined with a measure of clarity. As the Indian 
leadership has successfully taken a significant 
posture in the international political platform 
after 1998 till date, it has become easier on the 
part of the Russian leadership to choose amongst 
the cluster of Third World countries, whom to 
interact closely. The India has also strengthened 
various sectors of its economy significantly like 
the software sector and the information sector. 
This has opened major avenues where scope of 
mutual interdependence has arisen between India 
and Russia, which needs high level of political 
cooperation between the leaderships of both 
the nations. Especially after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the twin trade towers 
of the World Trade Centre in New York and the 
initiation of the “War on Terror” by United States 
with a large alliance of nations, India and Russia 
have made many bilateral agreements to deal with 
the issue of terrorism in their own manner. 
On various terrorist incidents that have 
taken place in Russia (2003-2004), especially in 
Beslan, Yessentuki, Moscow and in other places, 
Indian establishment has been quick to show the 
‘solidarity with the Russian Government in its 
efforts directed towards tackling the problems of 
terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism, which 
have international links.’4
Close and friendly ties between India and 
Russia, based on continuity, trust and mutual 
understanding, constitute an important foreign 
policy priority for both countries. There is a 
consensus in both countries on maintenance 
of good bilateral relations. Recognition of the 
strategic dimension to Indo-Russian relations has 
grown. India and Russia share similar perceptions 
on many international issues.
While the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee was on a visit to Moscow in 2003, he 
mentioned that “Sky is the limit” for the strategic 
partnership and cooperation between India and 
Russia, adding that the friendship between the 
countries has become a “stabilising force” in 
the changed world scenario. The friendship has 
remained unchanged despite economic problems 
and political instability.
The national goals of two countries are being 
looked upon in the light of new international 
realities. The two countries have once again begun 
to rediscover the mutual importance but with a 
qualitative difference, which commensurate with 
the realities of the post cold war era.
The Strategic Dimension –  
The Post Cold War Days
From 1959 India had accepted Soviet offers 
of military sales. Indian acquisition of Soviet 
military equipment was important because 
purchases were made against deferred rupee 
payments, a major concession to India's chronic 
shortage of foreign exchange. Simultaneous 
provisions were made for licensed manufacture 
and modification in India, one criterion of self-
reliant defense on which India placed increasing 
emphasis. 
India used Soviet economic and military 
aid to pursue its own regional goals, the most 
important of which were containment of Pakistan 
and China. In other words, the Soviet Union and 
India had the basis for an ideal relationship: India’s 
needs matched for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet 
needs were a match for India’s strengths. The 
Soviet-Indian relationship works best when both 
perceive a link between China and Pakistan.
The contextual imperatives that forged the 
India-Russia strategic cooperation were from the 
Indian side: US-Pakistan military alliance and 
aid, Indo-US estrangement, the Sino-Pak strategic 
relationship and the Sino-Pak-US strategic 
convergence. On the Russian side the imperatives 
were: Sino Russian military confrontation, the 
Sino-US quasi-strategic relationship of the 1975s 
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-1980s and the Russian need to reach out to 
Third World countries through India. The basic 
and common denominator on both sides was 
the containment of China and Pakistan. These 
contextual imperatives underwent a sea-change 
with President Gorbachev coming in to power 
in 1990. He initiated what can be described as 
Russia’s ‘China First’ priority. Russia’s strategic 
shift in its foreign policy formulations removed 
the planks on which rested the India-Russia 
strategic cooperation.
The primary short-term military concern 
for India in the early 1990s was its limited 
supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-
produced armaments. After three decades of 
reliance on Soviet-produced hardware, India was 
in a position in 1991 in which seventy percent of 
Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force 
armaments, and eight-five percent of Navy 
armaments were of Soviet origin. Lacking the 
indigenous capability to produce spare parts and 
supplies for these systems, India’s military faced 
an immediate crisis. The break-up of the Soviet 
Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-Indian 
military supply-line as the administrative control 
and actual locations of the Soviet defense industries 
were situated throughout the newly independent 
states. «As Air Vice-Marshall S. Krishnaswamy 
noted with some understatement, there was a 
‘hiccup’ in supply relations during 1991-92.» 
Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had 
allowed India to postpone developing a self-
reliant indigenous defense industry. More to the 
point, «the dependence on Russian weapons over 
30 years was a serious strategic defect.»5
Defense relations still drive the Indo-
Russian relationship. Russia is India’s biggest 
supplier of defense equipment, and India is the 
cash-strapped Russian defense industry’s biggest 
customer. India is the only country with which 
Russia is engaged in the joint development and 
production of high tech, very complex weapons 
systems. In October 2000, Russia and India 
finalized defense deals worth $3 billion for 140-
150 Su-30 multi-role fighters, and 310 T-90S main 
battle tanks, with payments and deliveries spread 
over five years. In January 2002, the Indian Air 
Force (IAF) added stealth modifications to its 
$340million program to upgrade 125 of its MiG-
21bis fighters to MiG-21-93 standard.6
Indo-Russian cooperation in the area 
of defence supplies is gaining momentum in 
contemporary times. Indo-Russian defence 
supplies are in the range of 70 per cent of total 
defence imports of India. Agreements on 
scientific collaboration between India-Russia 
in the area of biotechnology have begun a new 
phase. Agreements have been signed for the 
Mig 29 K fighter, Kamov 31 helicopters, T 90S 
tanks and other defence equipment. Nearly $ 3 
billion defence contracts have been finalized. 
Indian Navy has acquired two submarines and 
three frigates from Russia, which costs around 
$ 300 million each. The Navy is also acquiring 
three Krivak-class frigates or project 1135.6 from 
Russia. There are some indicators, which suggest 
that Indo-Russian cooperation in the peaceful 
use of nuclear technology, related particularly to 
nuclear energy have already taken concrete shape. 
In the oil and gas sector, Gas Authority of India 
Ltd.(GAIL) and Russia’s Gazprom have signed 
a contract in the field of oil exploration.7 Indo-
Russian politico-strategic defence cooperation 
is an important element of strategic partnership 
between the two countries.
Presently Russia though not considered 
being as much powerful as it was during the 
pre-Cold War days still maintains the strategy of 
curtailing the monopolistic tendencies of the US. 
According to Russian Defence Minister Marshall 
Igor Dmitrievich Sergeyev in an interview given 
to The Hindu stated that “the United States in this 
unipolar world seeks to cash in on the Cold War 
outcome, pursuing its own strategic interests. And 
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the issues are as follows: either the world will go 
back to multipolarity typical of the previous stags 
of historical development or one superpower will 
dominate the system of international relations. 
However, it is too early to draw final conclusions, 
since only two trends are well discernible and 
other development patterns may emerge. A 
contributing factor is the effective and fruitful 
cooperation between Russia and India in regional 
and international affairs and Indo-Russian ties are 
rising to the level of real strategic partnership.”8
In December 2002, India and Russia 
reaffirmed a long-standing friendship through the 
adoption of the Delhi Declaration. Since both the 
countries are struggling to define their relations 
with other major players on the global stage, in a 
situation where the rules of international politics 
are in a state of flux and where the term of the 
economic interaction between nations are being 
reset, this specific encounter between the Indian 
and Russian leaderships was of significance 
for the affirmation of continuity and mutual 
reassurance that it symbolized.9 
Between Vladimir Putin's first visit to India 
as president of Russian Federation in October 
2000 and his second visit in December 2002, the 
framework for India-Russia relations was firmly 
set.10 This was a framework of another special 
relationship of «Strategic Partnership», expanding 
cooperation and multiplying contacts in various 
fields, some of them of critical importance to 
India-Russia both. 
Undoubtedly, both India and Russia are 
sovereign countries and would be looking after 
their own in the first instance. The understanding 
between Russia and India flowed from the 
complimentarily of their interests both in 
historical, geopolitical and futuristic terms. 
Whether it was the question of terrorism or of the 
defence of Indian territorial integrity or that of 
Russia, whether it was a question of India’s role in 
this region and the world and on most international 
issues of importance to the two countries, the 
Russian and Indian interests generally tended 
to coincide and there is a certain empathy for 
each other.11 There is therefore, an intrinsic value 
in the Indo-Russia ties. This does not exclude 
differences of approach on certain specific issues, 
but the general, overall parallelism of interests 
has been evident. The two sides so far have soft 
understanding of each other’s concerns while 
retaining their autonomy of action and expanding 
their relations with diverse other countries.
The nuclear cooperation agreement
The nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Russia (2009) is essentially different from 123 
pact signed with the US (2008) that envisages not 
only ending of the ongoing nuclear cooperation 
but also the return of equipment and fuel supplied 
by the US, in case the nuclear agreement is 
terminated. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
made it amply clear that Moscow will not accept 
any restriction imposed by any foreign country 
on its civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi 
under any pressure. Replying to a pointed 
question if Russia would continue unrestricted 
nuclear cooperation with India despite the G-8 
resolution restricting the sale of reprocessing 
technologies to non-NPT countries, President 
Medvedev stressed that the ‘resolution does not 
change anything in our cooperation’. Under the 
agreement, Russia is expected to build 12-14 
reactors on India’s east coast. Russia’s continuing 
political backing for India was best illustrated 
when Putin publicly backed Indian permanent 
membership in an expanded United Nations 
Security Council during his last visit to Delhi. 
Russia and India also signed a Declaration on 
International Terrorism on November 2001.12
The Nuclear Strategic Dimension
The initial nuclear dimension that was 
practised by Soviet Union had practically more or 
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less no opposition from India, as she herself was 
not in as position to make any comments on any 
such significant world developments. However, 
with the first Pokhran blasts in 1974, India was 
criticised by the Soviet leadership along with the 
US administration, and as it was the age of détente, 
it became difficult for the Indian leadership to 
pursue its own nuclear policy during that period. 
On the nuclear strategic issue, especially 
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – Moscow stands 
firmly with the West. However, these issues 
normally stand in the way of mutual cooperative 
agreements and became an issue, especially after 
the 1998 nuclear tests taken by India.
Though Russia wholly criticised India’s 
decision to go ahead with the nuclear tests in 1998, 
but it also went against the manner in which the 
international community went ahead imposing 
sanctions on India and later on Pakistan. It was 
commented that sanctions usually prove to be 
counter productive and diplomacy must be tried 
to bring about a change in India’s nuclear policy. 
It was also announced that such tests would not 
stop the cooperation with India in the civilian 
nuclear sector.13
The strategic dimension that has started 
growing during the present years has been more 
on the principle of mutual benefit than on the 
principle of threatening or curtailing a third 
country, the relationship having an entirely 
strategic bearing. 
Today there has been a significant line of 
thought that is prepared to accept a strategic 
triangle having India, Russia and China in it. 
The concept of a strategic partnership between 
India, Russia and China in a trilateral strategic 
arrangement is not a new one. Although the idea 
was sounded in the Brezhnev years (1964-1982) in 
the form of collective Asian security, it was never 
vigorously pursued. However, when the idea was 
again brought back by the Russian Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov, in the last week of December 
1998, the idea started became a topic of analyses 
amongst strategic circles. Considered by many as 
an axis of strength, and by some as an ephemeral 
eddy of Russian overtures in Asia, the idea was 
certainly born out of the conviction of having a 
viable regional security arrangement that would 
simultaneously countervail the growing US 
influence in the region. 
It has been seen that as both the nations 
have recognised each others’ strategic position 
and powers, they have started thinking about the 
initiation of the dialogue of disarmament between 
themselves. During the second presidential visit 
of Russian president Vladimir Putin to India, on 
December 3–5, 2002, the Russian President along 
with the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee signed 
a strategic declaration agreeing on a strategic 
partnership mandated to hold annual summit-
level meetings and make efforts to reduce nuclear 
arms globally with the ultimate aim to eliminate 
these weapons.14 
India's acquisitions from the USSR/Russia 
comprise 70% of its major weapons systems, and 
include up-to-date tanks, fighter aircraft, cruise 
missiles, and an aircraft carrier. In the future, 
energy cooperation may prove just as beneficial 
for both sides. Indian firms are involved in 
collaborative projects on Sakhalin and in the 
Caspian region, and Russia has cooperated on 
eighty hydro and thermoelectric projects-as well 
as a light-water reactor plant-in India.15
The Gorshkov Aircraft Carrier Deal  
and Leasing  
of Nuclear Submarine from Russia 
The Vikramaditya, formerly the Soviet 
Union's Admiral Gorshkov, (was originally built 
as the Soviet Project 1143.4 class aircraft carrier 
originally laid down in 1978 at the Nikolayev 
South shipyard in Ukraine, launched in 1982, and 
commissioned with the Soviet Navy in 1987) has 
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finished a long-delayed refit for the Indian Navy 
at Sevmash on the Kola peninsula. The ship was 
extensively modified to undertake STOBAR 
(short takeoff but assisted recovery) operations 
with MiG-29K naval fighter aircraft, as well as 
receiving new air defense, communications and 
navigations systems. India and Russia signed a 
$947 million dollar deal in 2005 for the purchase 
of the carrier, but delivery has already been 
delayed twice, pushing up the cost of refurbishing 
the carrier to $2.3 billion. 
The Project 1143.4 carriers and a class of 
destroyers with the same engines suffered a 
history of boiler failures during their service 
lives. However, the incident in the Barents Sea 
couldn't have come at a worse time for bilateral 
ties. Russia has lost a string of military deals, 
notably for MRCA and helicopters. From the 
public’s point of view the latest soap opera needs 
to end soon. Sevmash Shipyard in North Russia, 
where Vikramaditya is being refitted, needs 
to get its act together. There are reports in the 
Russian press about mismanagement and lack of 
accountability at the company.16
Indian Navy’s lease of the nuclear submarine 
Nerpa 971 at the cost of $920 mln in January,2011 
has been the third biggest transfer. The lease 
of the nuclear powered submarine Nerpa and 
Russia’s not-so-secret help with the development 
of India’s own nuclear submarine, Arihant, are 
pointers to the deep ties between the countries. 
Again, these are not off-the-shelf technologies 
and Russia is not sharing them with any other 
country. The thickest action is on the seas where a 
Russian Akula II class nuclear attack submarine 
(renamed Chakra II) is transforming India’s 
sea doctrine. Russian expertise is helping build 
India’s first nuclear powered submarine ‘Arihant’. 
Former Russian ambassador to India, Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov, says Russia provided “some degree 
of assistance” in developing the Arihant’s naval 
propulsion reactor despite Russia being bound by 
an international treaty which prohibits technology 
transfer in this area”. IDSA’s Thornton agrees: 
“Russia does not see India as a strategic rival 
and has faith in the country’s willingness to 
keep to agreements and not, as Moscow claims 
the Chinese have done, to illegally make use of 
Russian intellectual property.” As the scope of 
joint defence development grows, the two sides 
will encounter a myriad of problems but none of 
it has to be a deal breaker.
Russia and India are working with BrahMos 
Aerospace to promote a family of all-purpose 
supersonic BrahMos land-launched and ship-
launched versions of the missile based on the 
Russian medium-range P-800 Onyx anti-ship 
missile, which some experts believe is unrivalled 
in the global marketplace. According to Russia’s 
deputy prime minister in charge of the defence 
industry, Dmitry Rogozin, “BrahMos Aerospace 
is not only a successful Russo-Indian joint 
venture, but it also represents an optimal model 
for bilateral cooperation that has tremendous 
political importance for both countries”.
Conclusion:
While assessing the section of the strategic 
and political dimension of India and Russia, 
there needs no requirement of any explaining 
how these two nations have come closer to each 
other at least in these dimensions better than that 
of the Cold War days as the relationship today 
has grown on a sense of parity than that of over 
independence of India on Russia, as was the case 
during the Cold War years. As there remains no 
drastic clash of political ideology today. Relations 
between the two nations have been growing. 
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Cтатья посвящена стратегическим отношениям между Индией и Россией, которые прошли 
через разные стадии развития в 1947-1956 гг., 1956-1971 гг., 1971-1985 гг., 1985-1996 гг. и с 1996 г. В 
каждую из этих стадий отношения между Россией и Индией испытывали подъем или падение 
в зависимости от того, какие ожидания обе страны имели в отношении Запада. Сложный 
период в отношениях между Россией и Индией после 1985 г. связан с необходимостью обеих 
стран более плотно сотрудничать с Западом. Настоящая статья также охватывает период 
распада Советского Союза и окончание “холодной войны”, которые привели к фундаментальной 
трансформации. Индия использовала экономическую и военную помощь России для своих 
региональных целей, одной из которых было сдерживание агрессии со стороны Пакистана и 
Китая. История показывает, что двусторонние отношения работают лучше всего, когда обе 
страны видят взаимосвязь между Китаем и Пакистаном.
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стратегические аспекты взаимоотношений между Индией и Россией.
